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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY—LANHAM ACT—CULPABLE CONDUCT
OTHER THAN WILLFUL INFRINGEMENT OF A MARK IS SUFFICIENT TO
CONSTITUTE AN EXCEPTIONAL CASE UNDER 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) FOR
AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES—SecuraComm Consulting, Inc. v.
Securacom Inc., 224 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2000).
In 1980, Ronald Libengood founded SecuraComm Associates, a
security systems consulting firm located in Pennsylvania.
SecuraComm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 274-75
(3d Cir. 2000). Libengood incorporated his firm in 1992, renaming it
SecuraComm Consulting, Inc. (SecuraComm Pennsylvania). Id. at
275. In 1993, Libengood applied for federal registration the service
mark “Securacomm” for security consulting.
The mark was
registered in 1997.
Libengood became aware of a New Jersey firm in the nuclear
security field called Burns & Roe Securacom in 1987. Though the
names were similar, Libengood took no action because of the
differing clientele of the firms and the addition of the words “Burns
& Roe” to the firm name was not likely to cause confusion.
In 1992, however, the Burns & Roe Securacom firm adopted the
name Securacom Incorporated (Securacom New Jersey) and
expanded its business activities to include a wider range of security
services. When Libengood learned of Securacom New Jersey’s new
name and expanded business in early 1993, he immediately sent
them a cease-and-desist letter. For the next two and one-half years,
Libengood attempted to resolve the conflict with Securacom New
Jersey. Libengood ultimately offered to sell the SecuraComm
Pennsylvania mark to Securacom New Jersey for
$275,000. After receiving no response to his offer, Libengood
threatened to file suit against Securacomm New Jersey.
Securacomm New Jersey’s chairman of the board, Wirt D. Walker,
III, subsequently threatened Libengood with financial ruin if he filed
suit.
In the fall of 1995, Libengood filed suit under the Lanham Act
in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. Id.
at 275-76. Securacom New Jersey answered with counterclaims
identical to those pled by SecuraComm Pennsylvania, as well as a
libel claim. Id. at 276. Shortly thereafter, Securacom New Jersey
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also filed suit against Libengood and his attorney in New Jersey
State Superior Court alleging various business-related torts and
statutory violations. Id. Due to ethical obligations, Libengood’s
attorney was forced to withdraw as counsel in the Lanham Act suit
because he was named in the subsequent suit with Libengood. Id.
Upon consolidation of the federal and state suits, the district court
dismissed Securacom New Jersey’s state suit as meritless. Id.
In addition to these actions, Securacom New Jersey petitioned
the Patent and Trademark Office for the cancellation of Securacomm
Pennsylvania’s service mark, and filed suit in the District of
Columbia Superior Court claiming service mark infringement by
SecuraComm Pennsylvania. Id. Upon removal of that case to the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia, the district
court in New Jersey enjoined pursuit of the suit by Securacomm
New Jersey in the District of Columbia pending the results of the
original case. Id.
In the fall of 1997, a bench trial in the District Court for the
District of New Jersey found that Libengood had proved conclusive
service mark ownership and that Securacom New Jersey had
willfully infringed on that mark. Id. The district court issued an
injunction preventing Securacom New Jersey from using
“Securacom” in the United States and Puerto Rico. Id. at 276-77.
The court awarded relief to SecuraComm Pennsylvania in the form
of ten percent of Securacom New Jersey’s profits. Id. at 277. In
addition, the court found that the egregious circumstances of this
case warranted an award of treble damages and attorney’s fees. Id.
On appeal, the Third Circuit vacated the award of Securacomm
New Jersey’s profits, as the court found that the record was
inadequate to permit an inference of willful infringement. Id.
Because the finding of willful infringement was the primary factor
in awarding attorney’s fees, the appellate court remanded for a
determination of whether any other exceptional circumstances
justified such relief. Id. Prior to the remand, Securacom New Jersey
moved to have the district court judge recuse himself. Id.
On remand, the district court first denied the recusal motion.
Id. In addition, the District Court found exceptional circumstances
and awarded attorney’s fees in the amount of $233,600.26 pursuant
to § 35 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). Id. The court held
that Securacomm New Jersey’s bad faith negotiations and use of
oppressive litigation tactics satisfied the exceptional case
requirement of the Lanham Act. Id.
Securacom New Jersey again appealed to the Third Circuit for
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the denial of their recusal motion and the award of attorney’s fees.
Id. The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court for the District of
New Jersey. Id. at 283.
Judge Sloviter, writing for a unanimous appeals panel, first
addressed the recusal motion. Id. at 278. The court observed that
under the statutory standard, recusal is only appropriate when a
reasonable person could question a judge’s impartiality.
Id.
Further, the judge maintained that the justification for recusal rarely
originates in the judicial proceedings, but rather is usually found in
some extra-judicial source. Id. Continuing, Judge Sloviter observed
that in the instant case, all the bases for recusal proffered by
Securacom New Jersey were to be found in the judicial proceedings
before the district court. Id. After a thorough review of the court
record, the panel found that recusal was not warranted and affirmed
the district court’s denial of the motion. Id.
The court, turning to the award of attorney’s fees, first observed
that the Lanham Act permits an award of reasonable attorney fees to
the prevailing party only in cases of exceptional circumstances. Id.
at 279. Judge Sloviter maintained that in trademark infringement
cases, contrary to Securacom New Jersey’s contention, exceptional
circumstances can be found even if a defendant is not found to have
willfully infringed a plaintiff’s mark. Id. The judge noted that the
purpose for the earlier remand, after the appellate court’s finding
that willful infringement was lacking, was to determine whether
attorney’s fees were warranted by other circumstances. Id. The
court next opined that the legislative history of the Lanham Act and
judicial precedent do not limit exceptional circumstances to
instances of willful infringement, but rather include all culpable
conduct by a losing party during the litigation, including acts of bad
faith, malice, or fraud. Id. at 279-80.
Continuing, Judge Sloviter pointed out that an award of
attorney’s fees is available to both plaintiffs and defendants in
trademark infringement cases, and not just against the party that
willfully infringed. Id. at 280. The judge explained that if a
defendant were to prevail at trial, the plaintiff’s conduct during
litigation could provide justification for a finding of exceptional
circumstances and a subsequent award of attorney’s fees. Id.
The court then noted that the Lanham Act’s legislative history
required an examination of equitable considerations in each case
when assessing an award of attorney’s fees. Id. at 280-81. Although
the legislative history detailed that such an award was deemed
necessary to make a trademark holder’s remedy complete, Judge
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Sloviter explained that limiting the basis for attorney’s fees to a
defendant’s actions only during infringement would contravene the
equitable requirement of the statute to assess the circumstances as a
whole. Id. at 281. The judge maintained that willful infringement
by a defendant is but one factor to consider in determining whether
a finding of exceptional circumstances is warranted, and is not
exclusive of all others. Id.
Judge Sloviter next observed that the Patent Act contains a fee
provision identical to that in the Lanham Act, and that Congress
referred to the patent statute when adding the fee provision to the
Lanham Act. Id. The court maintained that the Patent Act does not
require willful infringement for an award of attorney’s fees, and
moreover, under the Act, the use of vexatious litigation tactics has
been found to justify an award of attorney’s fees. Id. (citations
omitted). Accordingly, the court held that “culpable conduct other
than willful infringement” can create an exceptional case for
purposes of the fee provision of the Lanham Act. Id. at 282.
Finally, Judge Sloviter determined that the District Court for
the District of New Jersey had not abused its discretion in awarding
attorney’s fees under the Lanham Act even though the district court
had denied such an award on SecuraComm Pennsylvania motion
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. Id. at 282. The court
maintained that the failure to pursue other available statutory
methods of obtaining attorney’s fees is not a bar to a finding of
exceptional circumstances and an award of attorney’s fees under the
Lanham Act. Id. Further, Judge Sloviter asserted that the grant of
attorney’s fees under the Lanham Act was based on the culpable
conduct that Securacom New Jersey displayed throughout the entire
case, not merely its conduct during the discovery process. Id. As a
result, the judge found no inconsistency on the part of the district
court in the award of attorney’s fees under the Lanham Act but not
under Rule 11. Id. The court concluded that the award of attorney’s
fees was warranted based on Securacom New Jersey’s attempt to
financially cripple its opponent through the use of oppressive
litigation tactics. Id. at 283.
In affirming the district court, the Third Circuit has sent a clear
message to litigants engaged in protracted litigation under the
Lanham Act. By dispensing with what appears to be delaying
tactics in a long and aggressive case, the court has indicated that
recourse to vexatious conduct may not only be tactically
unsuccessful, but may also subject litigants to financial penalties.
Moreover, by announcing the broad standard of “culpable conduct
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other than willful infringement” as grounds for the finding of
exceptional circumstances, the court gives notice to parties that
behavior not related to the use of the mark at issue is subject to
scrutiny for purposes of the fee provision. Finally, in holding that
vexatious litigation tactics alone may constitute an such “culpable
conduct” sufficient to justify an award of fees under the Act, the
court has clarified the circumstances under which a mark owner
may be subject to the fee provision. This decision will hopefully
result in a greater degree of civility in such litigation, and serve as a
deterrent to unnecessary and wasteful delaying tactics by both
owners of marks and alleged infringers.
Karen M. Whitney

